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Abstract: Security performance and the impact of imperfect channel state information (CSI) in
underlay cooperative cognitive networks (UCCN) is investigated in this paper. In the proposed
scheme, relay R uses non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) technology to transfer messages e1,
e2 from the source node S to User 1 (U1) and User 2 (U2), respectively. An eavesdropper (E) is also
proposed to wiretap the messages of U1 and U2. The transmission’s security performance in the
proposed system was analyzed and performed over Rayleigh fading channels. Through numerical
analysis, the results showed that the proposed system’s secrecy performance became more efficient
when the eavesdropper node E was farther away from the source node S and the intermediate
cooperative relay R. The secrecy performance of U1 was also compared to the secrecy performance of
U2. Finally, the simulation results matched the Monte Carlo simulations well.
Keywords: non-orthogonal multiple access; physical layer security (PLS); cooperative communication;
successive interference cancellation (SIC); decode-and-forward (DF); cognitive radio (CR); channel state
information; outage probability
1. Introduction
The UCCN is known as the CR which is a promising technology and innovative solution
for dealing with the radio spectrum allocation and precise requirements issues [1]. CR permits
secondary users (SUs or unlicensed users) to access the dormant frequency spectrum without causing
interruption to the primary users (PUs or licensed user). Due to SUs being accepted to the PUs at
the same time, the SUs have to keep their transmit powers within the acceptable levels. Besides that,
with rapidly extending wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in many areas of industry, the security of
information transfer becomes a more serious problem. Many researchers investigated PLS to help
security transmission between the source node and the destination node to improve and enhance the
secrecy of WSNs.
Recently, many solutions and technologies have been investigated for the purposes of speeding up
mobile data transmission, extending wireless communication range, and assisting users in connecting
security together. Examples of these technologies include amplify-and-forward (AF), orthogonal
multiple access (OMA), and energy harvesting [2–4]. NOMA technology, however, is a promising
method and has attracted significant attention in recent years [5–10].
NOMA technology has gradually become one of the most efficient solutions in developing the
fifth-generation mobile network (5G). In the NOMA technique, the users can share both time and
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frequency resources and only adjust their power allocation ratios. The users with better channel
conditions can serve as relays to enhance the system performance by using SIC [9]. This technology
improves the limitation of orthogonal multiple access (OMA). It meets the needs of end users in
providing access to data quickly and securely. NOMA and PLS are therefore very important techniques
in data transfer. They assist in transmitting signals from the source node to destination node with high
speed, efficiency, and data confidentiality.
Several studies have examined NOMA and PLS in wireless systems [11–13]. In [11], the authors
considered a cooperative relaying system using the NOMA technique to enhance the efficiency of the
transmitted signal. The researchers in [13] investigated the effectiveness of new schemes that combined
partial relay selection and NOMA in AF relaying systems to increase data transmission rates for 5G
mobile networks.
A considerable amount of literature has been published on PLS [14–16]. In [14], the authors
analyzed the secrecy performance of cooperative protocols with relay selection methods influenced by
co-channel interference. The authors in [15] inspected the impact of correlated fading on the secrecy
performance of multiple DF relaying that uses the optimal relay selection method. Some researchers
have also combined the NOMA technique with PLS [17–19]. In [17], the authors resolved the problem
of maximizing the minimum confidential information rate in users subject to the secrecy outage
constraint and instantaneous transmit power constraint. Cooperative NOMA systems with PLS in
both AF and DF were studied by the authors in [18].
The application of NOMA techniques and security principles in underlay cognitive radio networks
were also suggested by some authors in [20–24]. In [20], the authors discussed a cooperative
transmission scheme for a downlink NOMA in CR systems. This research exploited maximum
spatial diversity. The researchers in [24] considered secure communication in cognitive DF relay
networks in which a pair of cognitive relays were opportunistically selected for security protection
against eavesdroppers.
Channel state information (CSI) has a vital role in wireless communication systems. It describes
how a signal propagates from the source node to the relay, such as scattering, fading, and power
decay over distance. During a receiver’s set-up period, the CSI is evaluated and transferred to related
nodes in the system through a media access control protocol. In [25], the authors researched the effect
of imperfect channel CSI on secondary users in an underlay DF cognitive network with multiple
primary receivers. In [26], scientists studied the effect of imperfect CSI on a DF cooperative underlay
cognitive radio NOMA network in order to determine the optimal power allocation factors for different
user distances.
In most of the literature reported above, the combination of NOMA and PLS in a UCCN influenced
by CSI was not proposed. Motivated and inspired by the above ideas, a cooperative scheme is
suggested in this paper. In this scheme, a proposed UCCN using NOMA is required to both decode
and forward the messages e1 and e2 from node S to two destination nodes (U1 and U2) under the effect
of CSI and an eavesdropper. The secrecy performance of the communications e1 and e2 in the proposed
system were then examined and estimated in terms of secrecy outage probability over Rayleigh fading
channels to improve spectral efficiency and secure communication.
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:
- A study of the impact of imperfect CSI and the secrecy performance of a UCCN applying the
NOMA technique to improve system performance in a 5G wireless network.
- Secrecy outage probability (SOP) is performed over Rayleigh fading channels and verified with
Monte Carlo simulations.
- The results achieved by the proposed scheme demonstrate the security performance of U1 and U2.
- The secrecy performance of the proposed system improved when the distance between the
eavesdropper node E and the source and cooperative relay increased.
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The paper has five sections. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 describes the proposed
scheme’s system model. Section 3 presents the results of an analysis of the secrecy outage probability
at the source nodes. Section 4 presents the simulation results. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions.
2. System Model
Figure 1 illustrates the influence of imperfect CSI in a UCCN using NOMA and PLS. The system
model consists of the source nodes S transferring a superimposed signal e1 and e2 to U1 and U2,
respectively, through relay node R. One eavesdropper node E is proposed to wiretap the signals e1, e2
of the links S-U1, S-U2. In addition, the system model also consists of a node Pu which is known as the
primary user having the license. Due to the interference constraint at the Pu node in the UCCN, the
relay R and source S adjust their transmitting powers. In this model, we assume that the intermediate
relay node R operates in DF relaying method and applies the NOMA principle under the influence of
imperfect CSIs and PLS in UCCN. In addition, the variances of Zero-mean White Gaussian Noises
(AWGNs) are equal, given as N0. In this work, the corresponding distances of the links S-Pu, R-Pu,
S-R, S-E, R-E, R-Pu, R-U1, and R-U2 in Figure 1 are given as lSPu, lRPu, lSR, lSE, lRE, lRPu, l1, and l2.
Regarding the system channels, hi represents the Rayleigh fading channel coefficient,
i ∈ (hSR, hSE, hSPu, hRE, hRPu, 1, 2). We assume that the channels hi do not change during block
time T and are independently and identically distributed between two consecutive block times [10].
Finally, all of nodes in the system model have a single antenna for transmitting and
receiving messages.
Figure 1. System model of NOMA and PLS under imperfect CSI in a UCCN.
In principle, there are two time slots involved in each system communication process, and are
given as follows:
At the first time slot, the source node S transfers the information eS to the relay R and the
eavesdropper node E, which is given by the math expression as
es =
√
β1Pse1 +
√
β2Pse2, (1)
where Ps is the power at source node S, e1, and e2 are the messages of U1, U2, respectively, with
E{|ej|2} = 1, j ∈ (1, 2), (E{e} being notated for the expectation process of e). The β1 and β2 are the
power allocation coefficients. Following the principle of the NOMA, we assume that β1 > β2 with
β1 + β2 = 1.
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Because of the estimation errors of channels hi, the evaluated fading channel coefficients at the
nodes are represented as follows [25]:
ĥi = ρhi +
√
1− ρ2εi, (2)
where ĥi, hi, and εi are modeled as the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with the random
variable fi = |ĥi|2. The correlation coefficient ρ ∈ [0, 1] is described as the average quality of the
channel estimation.
Notation: The Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) and probability density function (pdf) of the
random variable fi is denoted respectively as Ffi (x) = 1− e
− 1λi x and f fi (x) =
1
λi
e−
1
λi
x
, where λi = l
−β
i ,
and β is a path-loss exponent.
The received signal at R from source node S for decode e1 under impact imperfect CSIs is given
as follows:
ye1SR = hSRes + σR. (3a)
Replace hSR from formula (2), the signal y
e1
SR is calculated as
ye1SR =
√
β1Pse1
(
ĥSR−
√
1−ρ2εSR
ρ
)
+
√
β2Pse2
(
ĥSR−
√
1−ρ2εSR
ρ
)
+ nR
=
√
β1Pse1 ĥSR
ρ +
√
β2Pse2 ĥSR
ρ −
√
β1Pse1
√
1−ρ2εSR
ρ −
√
β2Pse2
√
1−ρ2εSR
ρ + nR,
(3b)
where nR denotes the AWGNs at the relay R with the same variance N0.
Because of applying NOMA technology, thanks to the deployment of SIC in NOMA principle,
firstly, the relay R decodes the signal e1 from formula (3b) and removes it, then the signal e2 will be
decoded without the component
√
β1Pse1 ĥSR
ρ in formula (3b). Therefore, the signal e2 received at R from
source S after removing the signal e1 is expressed as follows:
ye2SR =
√
β2Pse2ĥSR
ρ
−
√
β1Pse1
√
1− ρ2εSR
ρ
−
√
β2Pse2
√
1− ρ2εSR
ρ
+ nR. (4)
Similarly, the node E also wiretaps the packets e1 and e2 from S, respectively, and the received
signals at node E are obtained as follows:
ye1SE =
√
β1Pse1ĥSE
ρ
+
√
β2Pse2ĥSE
ρ
−
√
β1Pse1
√
1− ρ2εSE
ρ
−
√
β2Pse2
√
1− ρ2εSE
ρ
+ nE (5)
ye2SE =
√
β2Pse2ĥSE
ρ
−
√
β1Pse1
√
1− ρ2εSE
ρ
−
√
β2Pse2
√
1− ρ2εSE
ρ
+ nE, (6)
where nE denotes the AWGNs at the E with the same variance N0.
In the second time slot, after the received signals, the relay R sends them to the source nodes U1
and U2. Hence, the received signals at the destination node U1, U2 are given respectively as
ye1RU1 =
√
β1PRe1ĥ1
ρ
+
√
β2PRe2ĥ1
ρ
−
√
β1PRe1
√
1− ρ2ε1
ρ
−
√
β2PRe2
√
1− ρ2ε1
ρ
+ nU1 (7)
ye2RU2 =
√
β2PRe2ĥ2
ρ
−
√
β1PRe1
√
1− ρ2ε2
ρ
−
√
β2PRe2
√
1− ρ2ε2
ρ
+ nU2 , (8)
where nU1 , nU2 denote the AWGNs at the destination U1, U2 with the same variance N0, and PR is a
transmit power of the relay R.
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In the proposed scheme, under the interference constraint at the node Pu, the source node S and
relay node R have to adjust their transmitting powers so that the interference power at the Pu must
be less than a threshold value, which is assumed as Ith. The maximum powers of nodes S and R are
given, respectively,
PS =
Ith
|ĥSR|2
=
Ith
fSR
. (9a)
PR =
Ith
|ĥRPu|2
=
Ith
fRPu
. (9b)
Because the node E connects to the relay R directly, so it wiretaps the packets e1 and e2 from relay
R. Therefore, the received signals at E through the link R-E are expressed as
ye1RE =
√
β1PRe1ĥRE
ρ
+
√
β2PRe2ĥRE
ρ
−
√
β1PRe1
√
1− ρ2εRE
ρ
−
√
β2PRe2
√
1− ρ2εRE
ρ
+ nE. (10)
ye2RE =
√
β2PRe2ĥRE
ρ
−
√
β1PRe1
√
1− ρ2εRE
ρ
−
√
β2PRe2
√
1− ρ2εRE
ρ
+ nE. (11)
We define the received Signal-to-Interference and Noise Ratios (SINRs) as γ =
E
{|signal|2}/E {|overall noise|2}.
Firstly, we calculate the received Signal-to-Interference and Noise Ratios (SINRs) for decoding the
information signal e1.
Thus, from formula (3b), the SINR at the relay R with the link S-R is obtained as follows:
γe1SR =
β1PS |ĥSR |2
ρ2
β2PS |ĥSR |2
ρ2
+
β1PS(1−ρ2)λSR
ρ2
+
β2PS(1−ρ2)λSR
ρ2
+N0
= β1PS fSR
β2PS fSR+PS(1−ρ2)λSR(β1+β2)+ρ2N0 .
(12a)
Replacing PS =
Ith
fSR
in (9a), and setting P = IthN0 , γ
e1
SR is rewritten as
γe1SR =
Pβ1 fSR
Pβ2 fSR + P (1− ρ2) λSR + ρ2 fSPu , (12b)
Similarly, with the formula in (7), we also calculate γe1RU1 , and this is achieved by mathematical
expression as
γe1RU1 =
Pβ1 f1
Pβ2 f1 + P (1− ρ2) λ1 + ρ2 fRPu , (13)
where P = IthN0 .
Applying formulas (5) and (10), the received SINRs at the eavesdropper node E with the link S-E
and R-E are given, respectively, as follows:
γe1SE =
β1Ps fSE
β2Ps fSE + Ps (1− ρ2) λSE + ρ2N0
=
Pβ1 fSE
Pβ2 fSE + P (1− ρ2) λSE + ρ2 fSPu .
(14)
γe1RE =
Pβ1 fRE
Pβ2 fRE + P (1− ρ2) λRE + ρ2 fRPu . (15)
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In the second, similar to decoding the information signal e1, we find the received SINRs for
decoding the information signal e2 as follows.
We apply formulas (4) and (6), the received SINRs at the nodes R with the link S-R, and at the
eavesdropper node E with the link S-E are expressed, respectively, as follows:
γe2SR =
β2Ps fSR
β1Ps (1− ρ2) λSR + β2Ps (1− ρ2) λSR + ρ2N0 =
Pβ2 fSR
P (1− ρ2) λSR + ρ2 fSPu . (16)
γe2SE =
β2Ps fSE
Ps (1− ρ2) λSE + ρ2N0 =
Pβ2 fSE
P (1− ρ2) λSE + ρ2 fSPu . (17)
Similarly, with formulas (8) and (12), the received SINRs at the nodes U2 and E from relay R are
inferred, respectively, as follows:
γe2RU2 =
Pβ2 f2
P (1− ρ2) λ2 + ρ2 fRPu . (18)
γe2RE =
Pβ2 fRE
P (1− ρ2) λRE + ρ2 fRPu . (19)
Applying the Shannon capacity formula, the achievable rates of the links X–Y are formulated as
R
ej
XY =
1
2
log2(1+ γ
ej
XY ). (20)
where the ratio 1/2 represents the fact that data transmission is split into two time slots, X ∈ {S, R},
and Y ∈ {E,U1,U2}. The secrecy capacity of the UCCN systems with DF-based NOMA for the S-Uj
communication can be expressed as
SCj =
[
SC
ej
Uj
− SCejE
]+
, (21)
where [x]+ = max (0, x); SCeiSR and SC
ej
RUj are the secrecy capacities from the source node S to the relay
R and from the relay R to the destination Ui are given, respectively, as
SC
ej
SR = max(0, R
ej
SR − R
ej
SE). (22)
SC
ej
RUi
= max(0, R
ej
RUi
− RejRE). (23)
3. Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis
In this section, the secrecy outage probability for eavesdropping the signals of U1 and U2 in the
proposed scheme are analyzed. We assume that a node successfully and safely decodes the received
packet if its achievable secrecy capacity is larger than a threshold secrecy capacity SCth.
3.1. Secrecy Outage Probability of U1.
The secrecy outage probability of U1 occurring when U1 does not receive a signal safely from the
source node S under the malicious attempt of the eavesdropper E is expressed as follows:
OPU1 = Pr[min(SC
e1
SR, SC
e1
RU1
) < SCth]
= 1− Pr[SCe1SR ≥ SCth, SCe1RU1 ≥ SCth].
(24)
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Replacing SCe1SR = max(0, R
e1
SR − Re1SE) at formula (22) and SCe1RU1 = max(0, R
e1
RU1
− Re1RE) at (23)
in formula (24), the OPU1 is rewritten as follows:
OPU1 = 1− Pr
[
Re1SR − Re1SE ≥ SCth
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr 1.1
×Pr
[
Re1RU1 − R
e1
RE ≥ SCth
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr 1.2
(25)
Proposition 1. The probability of the Pr1.1, and Pr1.2 in (25) is given as
Pr 1.1 =

0 a ≤ θb
(
(1/λSPu)e−ψ11/λSR
(1/λSPu)+(ψ2/λSR)
− (1/λSRλSPu) I1
)
a > θb.
(26)
where
ψ11 =
φcλSE
(a− φb) ; ψ2 =
φρ2
(a− φb)
I1 =
∞∫
0
∞∫
(ψ11+ψ2x)
e−
(
1
λSPu
x+ 1λSR
y
)
e−
1
λSE
ζ1dxdy ,
ζ1 =
(
cλSE + ρ2x
) (
ay− φ (by+ cλSR + ρ2x))
[φb+ (φ+ 1)a] [by+ cλSR + ρ2x]− aby ,
Proof: See Appendix A.
Pr 1.2 =

0 a ≤ θb
(1/λRPu)e−ψ12/λ1
(1/λRPu)+ψ2/λ1
− (1/λ1λRPu) I2 a > θb
(27)
where
ψ12 =
φcλ1
(a− φb) ; ψ2 =
φρ2
(a− φb)
I2 =
∞∫
0
∞∫
(ψ12+ψ2x)
e−
(
1
λRPu
x+ 1λ1
y
)
e−
1
λRE
ζ2dxdy ,
ζ2 =
(
cλRE + ρ2x
) (
ay− φ (by+ cλ1 + ρ2x))
[φb+ (φ+ 1)a] [by+ cλ1 + ρ2x]− aby ,
Proof: See Appendix B.
From formulas in (26) and (27), the secrecy outage probability of the U1 is obtained as
OPU1 =

1 a ≤ φb
1−

(
(1/λSPu)e−ψ11/λSR
(1/λSPu)+(ψ2/λSR)
− (1/λSRλSPu)× I1
)
×
(
1/λRPue−ψ12/λ1
1/λRPu+ψ2/λ1
− (1/λ1λRPu)× I2
)
 a > φb
(28)
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3.2. Secrecy Outage Probability of U2
Similar to U1, the SOP of U2 can be expressed as
OPU2 = Pr
[
min
(
SCe2SR, SC
e2
RU2
)
< SCth
]
= 1− Pr
[
SCe2SR ≥ SCth, SCe2RU2 ≥ SCth
]
. (29)
Proposition 2. The secrecy outage probability of U2 in (26) is given as
OPU2 = 1−
(
1− 1
λSPuλSE
× I3
)
×
(
1− 1
λRPuλRE
I4
)
(30)
where
ζ3 =
(
φ(cλSR+ρ2x)
b + (φ+ 1)
(cλSR+ρ2x)
(cλSE+ρ2x)
y
)
,
ζ4 =
(
φ(cλ2+ρ2x)
b + (φ+ 1)
(cλ2+ρ2x)
(cλRE+ρ2x)
y
)
,
I3 =
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
[
e−
(
1
λSPu
x+ 1λSE
y
)
×
(
1− e−
ζ3
λSR
)]
dxdy,
I4 =
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
[
e−
(
1
λRPu
x+ 1λRE
y
)
×
(
1− e−
ζ4
λ2
)]
dxdy.
Proof: See Appendix C.
The integrals I1 and I2 in (28) and I3 and I4 in (30) are complex integrals and are difficult to resolve
practically. In this paper, however, the value of I1, I2, I3 and I4 can be found using numerical methods.
4. Simulation Results
In this section, the secrecy performance of a NOMA scheme and the impact of imperfect CSI
in a UCCN were examined, analyzed, and evaluated. The theoretical results of the analyses were
verified with Monte Carlo simulations. The coordinates of S, R, U1, U2, Pu, and E were set to
S(0, 0), R (xR, 0 ), U1
(
xU1 , yU1
)
= (1, 0) , U2
(
xU2 , yU2
)
= (0.75,−0.5) , Pu (xPu, yPu ), E (xE, yE ),
respectively, in the two-dimensional plane and satisfying (xi > 0 ). Hence, lSR = xR, lRU1 = xU1 − xR ,
lRU2 =
√
y2U2 +
(
xU2 − xR )2, lRPu =
√
y2Pu + (xPu − xR )2, lRE =
√
y2E + (xE − xR )2 , lSE =
√
y2E + x
2
E,
and lSPu =
√
x2Pu + y
2
Pu. We assume that the target secrecy capacity SCth = 0.5 (bit/s/Hz) and the
exponent β is set to a constant β = 3.
Figures 2 and 3 graph the SOP of the two Users U1 and U2 via SNR (dB) with SCth = 0.5
(bit/s/Hz). The relay R, Pu, U1, U2, and eavesdropper E are located in positions R (xR, 0) = (0.5, 0),
Pu (xPu, yPu) = (0.5,−1), U1
(
xU1 , yU1
)
= (1, 0), U2
(
xU2 , yU2
)
= (0.75,−0.5), E (xE, yE) = (0.5, 1),
respectively. From the results in Figure 2, we can see the effect of the eavesdropping node E to the
SOP when SNR is changed from 0 dB to 20 dB. With ρ = 0.95, the SOP values of User U1 are greater
than User U2 when SNR < 2.5 dB. Nevertheless, when the SNR increases from 2.5 dB to 30 dB, the
SOP of User U2 is better than User U1, and both also increase when the SNR increases as a result of
large transmitting power. Besides that, it is noted that imperfect CSI degrades the SOP of the signal.
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Figure 2. The SOP of U1 and U2 versus SNR (dB).
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Figure 3. The SOP of U1 and U2 versus SNR (dB) when ρ = 0.9 and ρ = 0.95.
In Figure 3, we observe the obvious affection of the channel estimation coefficient ρ to the SOP.
The SOP of the two users in case ρ = 0.95 outperforms the SOP in case ρ = 0.9. It means that the
system has been impacted by imperfect CSI. We also can see that the secrecy performance of the two
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Users also decreases when the SNR increases. The security system will be better and it is difficult for
the eavesdropper to wiretap the signal. These theoretical results match the simulation results of the
proposed system well. Hence, the derived equations are sufficiently accurate for use in analysis.
Figure 4 graphs the SOP of the two Users U1 and U2 via ρ when SNR=10 (dB) with SCth = 0.5
(bit/s/Hz). The relay R, Pu, U1, U2, and eavesdropper E are located in positions R (xR, 0) = (0.5, 0),
Pu (xPu, yPu) = (0.5,−1), U1
(
xU1 , yU1
)
= (1, 0), U2
(
xU2 , yU2
)
= (0.75,−0.5), E (xE, yE) = (0.5, 1),
respectively. As observed in Figure 4, the secrecy performance of U1 is better than U2 when ρ < 0.9.
However, when the correlation coefficient ρ > 0.9, the SOP of U2 is less than U1. This means that the
effects of the evaluation errors decrease when the correlation coefficients ρ increase. In addition, the
secrecy performance of two Users is more efficient when the channel estimation coefficient ρ is higher.
ρ
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Figure 4. The SOP of U1 and U2 via ρ when SNR = 10 (dB).
Figure 5 graphs the SOP of the proposed scheme versus the position of the of eavesdropper E
on the y-axis when the coordinate value yE changes from 0.2 to 2 when SNR = 10 (dB), (bit/s/Hz),
R (xR, 0) = (0.5, 0), Pu (xPu, yPu) = (0.5,−1), U1
(
xU1 , yU1
)
= (1, 0), U2
(
xU2 , yU2
)
= (0.75,−0.5).
Figure 5 shows that the SOP of U1 and U2 decrease when yE increases. This means that the secrecy
transmission of the two Users will be intact when eavesdropper E moves farther away from source S
and relay R.
We can also see that the secrecy performance of U2 is better than U1 as a result of the proposed scheme
applying NOMA and using SIC to detect the signal under the effect of imperfect CSI on the system.
Figure 6 graphs the SOP of User U1 and U2 versus the power allocation coefficients β1 (changing
from 0.6 to 0.95) when SNR = 10 (dB),SCth = 0.5 (bit/s/Hz), R (xR, 0) = (0.5, 0), Pu (xPu, yPu) =
(0.5,−1), U1
(
xU1 , yU1
)
= (1, 0), U2
(
xU2 , yU2
)
= (0.75,−0.5), E (xE, yE) = (0.5, 1). This figure shows
the impact of a varying β1 on the system. When β1increases from 0.6 to 0.85, the SOP of U2 outperforms
the SOP of U1. The secrecy transmission of U1 is then better than U2 when β1 > 0.85. We can thus
observe the impact of β1 on the security performance of a UCCN system with a NOMA solution under
the effect of imperfect CSI.
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Figure 6. The SOP of U1 and U2 versus the power allocation coefficients β1 when SNR = 10 (dB).
5. Conclusions
A NOMA scheme with imperfect CSI in a UCCN was proposed in this paper. We also researched
the physical layer security to improve the secrecy performance. The secrecy performance was examined
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analyzed, evaluated by the secrecy outage probability of the achievable secrecy capacity, and over
Rayleigh fading channels. The obtained results show that the security performance of the system
model is decreased when the imperfect CSIs exists as well as the SNR increases. The proposed scheme
with the optimal imperfect CSIs can achieve the best performance. Besides that, we can see that the
node eavesdropper E is far from the source S and relay R, the security performance became more
security. In addition, the security performance of U1 and the security performance of U2 are also
compared with together. Lastly, the achieved results of the SOP matched well with the Monte Carlo
simulation results.
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations were used in this manuscript:
AF Amplify-and-forward
CR Cognitive radio
DF Decode-and-forward
NOMA Non-orthogonal multiple access
PLS Physical layer security
SIC Successive interference cancellation
SOP Secrecy outage probability
UCCN Underlay cooperative cognitive network
Appendix A
The probability Pr1.1 in formula (25) is rewritten as
Pr 1.1 = Pr
[
Re1SR − Re1SE ≥ SCth
]
= 1− Pr [Re1SR − Re1SE < SCth] . (A1)
Applying formula in (20), we calculate Re1SR =
1
2 log2(1+ γ
e1
SR), and R
e1
SE =
1
2 log2(1+ γ
e1
SE). Hence,
the probability Pr1.1 in (A1) is calculated by replacing Re1SR, R
e1
SE and is expressed as
Pr 1.1 = 1− Pr
[
1
2
log2(1+ γ
e1
SR) < SCth +
1
2
log2(1+ γ
e1
SE)
]
(A2)
Replacing γe1SR in (12b) and γ
e1
SE (14) into (A2), the probability Pr1.1 is obtained as
Pr 1.1 = 1− Pr
[
a fSR
b fSR + cλSR + ρ2 fSPu
< φ+ (φ+ 1)
a fSE
b fSE + cλSE + ρ2 fSPu
]
= 1− Pr
[
fSE >
a fSR
(
cλSE + ρ2 fSPu
)− φ (cλSE + ρ2 fSPu) (b fSR + cλSR + ρ2 fSPu)
[φb+ (φ+ 1)a] [b fSR + cλSR + ρ2 fSPu]− ab fSR
] (A3)
where
φ = 22SCth − 1; a = Pβ1; b = Pβ2; c = P
(
1− ρ2
)
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Using the pdf of the random variable fSPu into (A3), the probability Pr1.1 is expressed as
Pr 1.1 = 1− Pr
[
fSE >
a fSR
(
cλSE + ρ2 fSPu
)− φ (cλSE + ρ2 fSPu) (b fSR + cλSR + ρ2 fSPu)
[φb+ (φ+ 1)a] [b fSR + cλSR + ρ2 fSPu]− ab fSR
]
= 1−
∞∫
0
f fSPu (x)Pr
[
fSE >
a fSR
(
cλSE + ρ2x
)− φ (cλSE + ρ2x) (b fSR + cλSR + ρ2x)
[φb+ (φ+ 1)a] [b fSR + cλSR + ρ2x]− ab fSR
]
dx.
(A4)
We can see that [φb+ (φ+ 1)a]
[
b fSR + cλSR + ρ2 fSPu
]− ab fSR > 0.
Set M = a fSR
(
cλSE + ρ2 fSPu
)
, and N = φ
(
cλSE + ρ2 fSPu
) (
b fSR + cλSR + ρ2 fSPu
)
.
If M ≤ N, then (a− φb) fSR ≤ φ
(
cλSR + ρ2x
)
.
If M > N, then (a− φb) fSR > φ
(
cλSR + ρ2x
)
.
Hence, Pr 1.1 in (A4) is rewritten as
Pr 1.1 = 1−
∞∫
0
f fSPu (x)× (K1 + K2) dx, (A5)
where
K1 = Pr
[
(a− φb) fSR ≤ φ
(
cλSR + ρ2x
)]
;
K2 = Pr
 fSE >
a fSR(cλSE+ρ2x)−φ(cλSE+ρ2x)(b fSR+cλSR+ρ2x)
[φb+(φ+1)a][b fSR+cλSR+ρ2x]−ab fSR ;
(a− φb) fSR > φ
(
cλSR + ρ2x
)

K1 is resolved as follows:
K1 = Pr
[
(a− φb) fSR ≤ φ
(
cλSR + ρ2x
)]
=
 1 a ≤ φbPr [ fSR ≤ φ(cλSR+ρ2x)(a−φb) ] a > φb =
 1 a ≤ φbFfSR [ φ(cλSR+ρ2x)(a−φb) ] a > φb (A6)
Applying the CDF of the random variable fSR into (A6), K1 is solved in a closed-form expression as
K1 =
 1 a ≤ φb1− e− 1λSR
[
φcλSR
(a−φb)+
φρ2x
(a−φb)
]
a > φb
=
{
1 a ≤ φb
1− e−
1
λSR
(ψ11+ψ2x) a > φb
(A7)
where ψ11 = φcλSR
(a−φb) ; ψ2 =
φρ2
(a−φb) .
Similar to calculating K1, K2 is resolved as
K2 =

0 a ≤ φb
∞∫
(ψ11+ψ2x)
f fSR (y)Pr
[
fSE >
((
cλSE + ρ2x
) (
ay− φ (by+ cλSR + ρ2x))
[φb+ (φ+ 1)a] [by+ cλSR + ρ2x]− aby
)]
dy a > φb
(A8)
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We apply the pdf of the random variable fSR and the CDF of the random variable fSE, K2 in (A8)
is obtained as
K2 =

0 a ≤ φb
∞∫
(ψ11+ψ2x)
f fSR(y)× e
− 1λSE
(
(cλSE+ρ2x)(ay−φ(by+cλSR+ρ2x))
[φb+(φ+1)a][by+cλSR+ρ2x]−aby
)
dy a > φb
(A9)
Substituting K1 in (A7), and K2 in (A9) into (A5), Pr 1.1 is shown in two cases as
If a ≤ φb:
Pr 1.1 = 1−
∞∫
0
1
λSPu
× e−
1
λSPu
xdx = 0 (A10)
If a > φb:
Pr 1.1 = 1−

∞∫
0
f fSpu (x)(1− e
− 1λSR (ψ11+ψ2x))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω1.1
dx+
∞∫
0
f fSPu (x)
∞∫
(ψ11+ψ2x)
f fSR (y)e
− 1λSR ζ1dxdy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω1.2
 (A11)
where
ζ1 =
(
cλSE + ρ2x
) (
ay− φ (by+ cλSR + ρ2x))
[φb+ (φ+ 1)a] [by+ cλSR + ρ2x]− aby
The Ω1.1 in (A11) is calculated as
Ω1.1 =
∞∫
0
f fSPu(x)(1− e
− 1λSR (ψ11+ψ2x))dx
=
∞∫
0
1
λSPu
e−
1
λSPu
x
(
1− e−
1
λSR
(ψ11+ψ2x)
)
dx
= 1−
1
λSPu
e−
1
λSR
ψ11
1
λSPu
+ 1λSRψ2
(A12)
The Ω1.2 in (A11) is presented as
Ω1.2 =
∞∫
0
f fSPu (x)
∞∫
(ψ11+ψ2x)
f f1 (y) e
− 1λSE ζ1dxdy
=
∞∫
0
1
λSPu
e−
1
λSPu
x
∞∫
(ψ11+ψ2x)
1
λSR
e−
1
λSR
ye−
1
λSE
ζ1dxdy
=
1
λSRλSPu
∞∫
0
∞∫
(ψ11+ψ2x)
e−
(
1
λSPu
x+ 1λSR
y
)
e−
1
λSE
ζ1dxdy
(A13)
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Replacing the results of Ω1.1 in (A12) , and Ω1.2 in (A13) into (A11), we resolved the probability
Pr1.1 as follows:
Pr 1.1 =

0 a ≤ θb
(
(1/λSPu)e−ψ11/λSR
(1/λSPu)+(ψ2/λSR)
− (1/λSRλSPu) I1
)
a > θb
(A14)
where
I1 =
∞∫
0
∞∫
(ψ11+ψ2x)
e−
(
1
λSPu
x+ 1λSR
y
)
e−
1
λSE
ζ1dxdy
Appendix B
The probability Pr1.2 in formula (25) is rewrited as follows
Pr 1.2 = Pr
[
Re1RU1 − R
e1
RE ≥ SCth
]
= 1− Pr
[
Re1RU1 < R
e1
RE + SCth
]
. (A15)
using formula in (20), we calculate Re1RU1 , R
e1
RE and they achieved, respectively, as R
e1
RU1
= 12 log2(1+
γe1RU1), R
e1
RE =
1
2 log2(1+ γ
e1
RE).
Hence, the probability Pr1.2 in (A15) is calculated by replacing Re1RU1 , R
e1
RE, γ
e1
RU1
in (13), and γe1RE
in (15), we have a result as
Pr 1.2 = 1− Pr
[
1
2
log2
(
1+ γe1RU1
)
<
1
2
log2
(
1+ γe1RE
)
+ SCth
]
= 1− Pr
[
a f1
b f1 + cλ1 + ρ2 fRPu
< θ + (θ + 1)
(
a fRE
b fRE + cλRE + ρ2 fRPu
)] (A16)
Similar as Pr1.1 at (A2), Pr1.2 is obtained as
Pr 1.2 =

0 a ≤ θb
(1/λRPu)e−ψ12/λ1
(1/λRPu)+ψ2/λ1
− (1/λ1λRPu) I2 a > θb
(A17)
where
ψ12 =
θcλ1
(a− θb) ;
I2 =
∞∫
0
∞∫
(ψ12+ψ2x)
e−
(
1
λRPu
x+ 1λ1
y
)
e−
1
λRE
ζ2dxdy ;
ζ2 =
(
cλRE + ρ2x
) (
ay− θ (by+ cλ1 + ρ2x))
[θb+ (θ + 1)a] [by+ cλ1 + ρ2x]− aby .
Finally, from (A14) and (A17), the secrecy outage probability OPU1 of U1 is resolved as (28)
Appendix C
Substituting formulas (22) and (23) into (29), we calculate similar to Appendices A and B, and the
OPU2 is given as
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OPU2 = 1− Pr
[
Re2SR − Re2SE ≥ SCth
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω2.1
×Pr
[
Re2RU2 − R
e2
RE ≥ SCth
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω2.2
(A18)
Firstly, we calculate the probability of Ω2.1 as follows:
Ω2.1 = Pr
[
Re2SR − Re2SE ≥ SCth
]
= 1− Pr [Re2SR < SCth + Re2SE]
= 1− Pr
[
1
2
log2
(
1+ γe2SR
)
< SCth +
1
2
log2
(
1+ γe2SE
)]
= 1− Pr
[
fSR <
φ
(
cλSR + ρ2 fSPu
)
b
+ (φ+ 1)
(
cλSR + ρ2 fSPu
)
(cλSE + ρ2 fSPu)
fSE
] (A19)
Applying the pdf of the random variables fSPu and fSE, (A19) is written as
Ω2.1 = 1−
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
[
Pr
[
fSR <
φ
(
cλSE + ρ2x
)
b
+ (φ+ 1)
(
cλSR + ρ2x
)
(cλSE + ρ2x)
y
]
× f fSPu (x) f fSE (y)
]
dxdy
= 1− 1
λSPuλSE
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
e−( 1λSPu x+ 1λSE y) ×
1− e− 1λSR
(
φ(cλSR+ρ2x)
b +(φ+1)
(cλSR+ρ2x)
(cλSE+ρ2x)
y
) dxdy
(A20)
Ω2.2 is calculated similarly as (A20) and is given as
Ω2.2 = 1− 1
λRPuλRE
∞∫
0
∞∫
0
e−( 1λRPu x+ 1λRE y) ×
1− e− 1λ2
(
φ(cλ2+ρ2x)
b +(φ+1)
(cλ2+ρ2x)
(cλRE+ρ2x)
y
)
 dxdy (A21)
Finally, with formulas (A20) and (A21), the secrecy outage probability of U2 is obtained by the
expression as (30).
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